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~IAXIK-GESEIUL SIK J. LISTORS SIhEJIOSS, K.C.E., RE., &C., Bc., 
iii tlic Chair. 
Iiy Gnptniii I:. II. SroniEm, E.E., Iiistrirctor ii i  Tclegi-npliy, School 
of Nilitary Eiigiiiccring, C1iatli:iiii. 
I I I A W  foiiiid i t  an cstrciiicly tIificuIt iiinttcr to COIII~I’CSS w i t h  tlic 
limits of nii hour nII that I feel ought to bc said on tIic silbjcct of 
XiIitnry ‘CcIcynpIiy nn(1 SigunIliiig. Iii cirnwiug up this pnlicr, I 
liavc tlicrcforc confiiic? mj-seIf to geiicrnI priiiciplcs, without nttciiiptiiig 
to enter irito details. 
iliougli tclegrnphy, i i i  tlic form of visual signdIiiig, has bceii c11iploy~(l 
from tiiiie iiiiiiicmorinI for \v:irIiIic piirposes both oil sliorc nntl aIlo:it, it is: 
oiily within about tlic lnst 15 j-ears tlint tlic electric tclegrnpli has ~ C C I J  so 
iiscd ; niid the g e n t  peg-rcss wIiicIi I ins  I)ccii made iri the short licrio(1 
:ibo\-c-iiiciitioiictl i i i  tlic tlcwlopiiicrit of this 1)r:iricli of militnry sciciicc, 
riiay I tliiiik bc fairly tnkcii n s  a critcrioii of tIic iiiiportaiicc of the part 
it  is likely to 1 h j -  ill fiiturc canipaigiis. 
Tclcgm~ilis for \vnrlikc purposes iiiny bc dividctl into two c: la~Sc~.  
1st.. As npplicd to n pcrinnnciit fortress. 
2ud. As rcqiiirctl for scrvicc with nil  i\rriiy iii tlic ficlrl. 
’\VitIi rcgartl to the first, tlic objects to bc ntt:;iiicrl arc- 
1st. Tlic rapid trniismissioii of mcssngcu froiii soiiic convcnienl 
c c n h l  point, a t  wliicli tlic OIficcr iii coiniiinnd ~vould cstnblisli liis 
liead-quarters, with ccrtniii points to bc sclcctcd on tlic scvcrnl per- 
iiinucut lines of dcfcnce. 
2 ~ ~ 1 .  Comiiiunicntioii with outworks. 
-*bid 3rd. In tlic casc of n scn fortress, tlic capability of communi- 
cating with sliippiiig. 
TO do this, hies  of electric tclcgrapli should bc estnblislied froii; 
he:id-qunrtcrs to certniu points on tlic ciicciiitc, froiii wliencc tlic 
communicatiou \vould bc continued by visual sigiinlliiig. ’ Tlie electric 
tclcgrnpli in this C ~ S C  would bc similar to x i  ordinary civil linc .of 
r 1  
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MILITARY TELEGRAPIIY AND . SIGXALLING. : 313 
tclegrapli, prccautions bciiig taken to place it iu such n positioii ns to 
bc safe from dcstructioii by nil enemy’s operations, and corercd from tho 
firc of his p s .  For this purpose i t  would probably be necessary to 
usc nn underground linc, buried a t  n considcrnblc dcpth bclow tlic siir- 
facc of tlic gromnd. Tlio cstcnsirc systcni of ~ o r l s  cowring tlio 
Dockyard at. Portsmoiith, offers n w r y  good csaniplc to illnstratc OW 
tlicory with rcgnrd to n pcrmnncnt fortrcas. Tliiis tlic IIilscn and 
Gosport lilies, tlic IIorso Sand, No Jlau’s, 2nd all otlicr dctnclicd forts, 
should bc connected by n systcni of clcctric tclcgrnpli with Iiend- 
qiinrtcrs, d i i l c  risiinl s i g n n l  stations, in conucction with tlic clcctric 
telegrnpli and in extension tliereof, slionld be cstnblisIicd on all tlic 
:icl\.aiiccd forts Iookirig scau-ard, to couiiiiiiilicntc with sliippiiig, nntI oii 
ccrtnin points on tlic laiitl dcfcuccs, to cnnblc comini~r~ic:ition to be 
I i c~~ t ,  up with :L forcc wliicli niiglit n t  any tinic 1Jc tlirow1i out to 
watch mi cncniy’s procccdings. I would hcrc rctiinik tlint it would be 
quitc inipossiblc to work nuy systeiii of dcfcucc by siibmnriiic mines, 
or, as t h y  arc comnioiily cnllcd, torpcdocs, or nny of tho niorc deli- 
cate modes of detcrmiiiiiig tiic distnuccs of ships ii i  iiiotioii, iiivolvitig 
simultuueous obscrratioiis froiii the distniit cstrcniitics of n Ioiig basc, 
to ndvnntagc 11-itlioiit n wcll dcviscd system of clcctric tclegraphy. 
. Tlicrc is iiotliitig w r y  spccinl iii tlic systcni of clcctric tclegraphy 
rcquirerl for tlie piirposcs of n I)crtiianciit fortress, niitl ilic visual. sig- 
iialling apparatus n-oiild IJC of the pattcriis which, with tlic vcrj- ablc 
nssistaiicc of Cnptaiu Colonib, ILX., mil Nn jo r  Uolton,’lntc of tlic 12th 
Ilcginient, Iinrc bccn dccidcd on ns npplicnblc for. thy and night 
signalling and coiiiiiiunicntion with tlic Royal Savy, iu coiiiicctioii with 
~~cruiancrit works,. YPL, shutters, coiies, mid flags for clay sigunlling, 
:ind lanips for night. 
Wc 11aw found by practice tlint -the most perfect systcin of tclc- 
grnphy for military purposcs is tlint i n  wliicli tlic clcctric tclcgrnpli 
has bccri com1)iiictl with visual sigiinlliirg, thc lnttcr fornilng n mnst 
important adjunct to, : i d  cstcnsioii of, tlic fornicr, nntl this is cqnally 
the casc ivlictlicr npplicd to tlic rcqiiircmcnts of n pcrnimient fortress, 
or n!lnptcd for scrvicc 11-itli an nrniy in tlic field. 111 cithcr case tlic 
clcctric without tlic risunl, or tlic visunl without tlic clcctric systcm, is 
bcreft of linlf i ts  iiti1it.y niid cEcicncy. It is, thcrcforc, ~icccssnry in 
considering tlic qiwstioii to treat of both as cssentinllyconiponcrit parts 
of OllC systc1ii. 
I IIOW pass on to tlic second npplicntioii of telcgrnpliy for militnry 
piirposcs, riz., tlint adapted for scrvicc with nn Army i n  tlic ficltl. Tlic 
objccts to bc attalicd by nil equipment for such n scrvicc, :ire as 
f O l l O ~ W  :- 
1st. A comniunicntion with tlic bas0 of opcrations, wliicli xould 
form the mnin linc froin wJiich nll clsc sliould radiate. 
2nd. Tlic cstcusiou of this mnin liue of tekgr~pli ,  SO ns to I ~ c c ~ )  U p  
with tlic daily advnncc of ail Army. 
3rd. Tlic ~cstnblislimcnt of tclcgrnpliic commuitications with n force 
dctochcd for n special duty. 
4th. The cstnblishment of tclcgrnpliic commuuications from tlic 
cciitrc to the flaIllis of nn army in positioii. 
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314. 3IILITARP TELEGRAPHY .AND SIGNALLIKG. 
5th. Tlic connection of. the outposts of an army by iiicaus of visual 
signalling, with tlic terniinal points of tlic clcctricnl part of tlic system. 
Atid Gth. Thc inenus of communica!ing with facility with n CO- 
opcratiug iiarnl f o r m  
Bcforc ciitcriug upon tlie discussion of the foriii of cquipruciit best 
adapted to mect the objects i n  vicu-, let us for a nioiiicnt cousiderwllat 
has already bccn acliicrctl by iiieans of tcIcgrapIiy. Commencing \Gitli 
tlie signal fires of savage nations, n gradual advancc lins taken pl:l~c, 
p s i n g  tliroiigli thc scvcrnl stages of improwmcnt, indicated by the 
iiiorc modcrii pattcrus of scnial)Iiorc, and culminating iu tlic clcctric 
tclcgrapli. Some system of tclcgrapliy l ins  alwnys bccn more OT less 
iiscd iii all ngcs. The ; icw that tlic Austrinii army, iintlcr tlic Arcli- 
dulrc Charles, ill 1809, was in motion, was coniniuuicated by n systclll 
of semaphores fkoiii tlic :lustriati frouticr to l’aris, and \rithin 24 I I O U ~ S  
of tlic dcspatcli of that ne~rs ,  Napoleon was on liis way to tnkc cou- 
mnnd of tlic Fi-ciich Ariiiy, ivith which Iic soon occupicd Viciiua, : 1 ~ 1  
fought tlic battles of h p c r ~ i  ntid IVagriiiii. Again, tlic celebrated 
liiics of Torrcs Vcdms were pro\-idcd with flagstaws siniilar to tliosc 
of n coast-guard station, and adapted for tlic traii.miissioii of sigtials 
by naval flags. Tllc Cossacks of tllc prcscilt day have n rougli systciii 
of signalling adapted to their work, wliicli coiisists in giiarcliirg 311 
cvtcusirc frontier. 
lkcetitly no war of :uiy importnncc has taken plticc i n  wliicli tho 
electric tclcgmpli has not bccti uscd. It was uscd by tlic 1biti.sli iii 
the Criincn, diiriiig tlic Iridiaii Iiintiny, in Chiiia, in Xcw Zeal:iiid, a t~d 
iu Abyasiiiin; b i  the French, during their recent campaign in Italy, :IS 
IYCII as prcviousIy iu the Crinien; during thc Italian cninpaign in Soutlicrli 
Italy, in 1SG0, aurl a t  the sicge of GHcta, and subscqucntly during tl!c 
campaigns in Lombardy ; by tlic Spaniards, (hiring the campnigii 111 
Norocco ; by both IWcraIs nnd Confederates duritig tlic recent rebellion 
in tlic United Statcs ; and last, tliough not Icast, by tlic Austrians and 
Prussians (luring thc canipnign in Ilolstciii, and subscqncntly during 
that in Uohcniia i n  ISGG. 
As an illnstrntion of wl:nt viaa donc 011 tlicsc occasions, one or two 
iiistaiiccs of irlticli TYO Iiavc n fcw antlientic tletnils, will suflicc to 
givc ail idcn of what may bc donc in future. 
Doring tlic 1iidi;iti mutiny in 1857-8, Lord Clydc’s Iicad-quarters 
u-erc grnerally it1 tclcgmpl~ic omniitnication with the seat of Govcrti- 
iiient :it Calcutta. Thcrc appears, unfortunately, to be no dctailcd 
account of tho iiistrulneiits atid means employed in the opcrations by 
which this dcsirablc ,result was effected. Tlicrc is, however, n \-cry 
short report, by tlie late Licntenaiit-Coloiiel Patrick Stcwart, C.B., 
R.E. (to wliosc unremitting eiicrgy i ts  siicccss was cutircly due), 
publislied in tlic rccords of tlic hidin Ofice, xrliicli gives n general iden of 
wliat was donc. A s  far ns I I inw bccii ablc to ascertain, it seems 
that tcniporiiry Iitics u-ere coustructcd, in continuation of tho pernia- 
nent lines of iltc country, to coiiiiect thc liead-quarters of Lord Clyde’s 
forcc with thc seat of Goreninicnt. Tlic pcrmancnt lines of the 
country being always along tlie main liucs of road, which formcd tlic 
communication with thc baso of operations, aurl wliicli. wcrc consc- 
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31lT~IThRl' TELEGRAPIIY AND SIGN~iT~LINU. 315 
qucntly, to n considcrablc cstcnt, gunrdcd and patrolled, interruptions 
to  telcgrapliic comriiuilicntion, due to thc rebel's opcrations, wcro 
cstrcnicly rarc. 
As regnrds tlic cainpigri in ISGG, cncli of thc two iiiaili Prussiaii 
nrmics opcrating i i i  Bolicniin liad nnc unit of ficld-tc.le~rap~~-equipinciit 
nttnclicd to it, n third unit  as attnchcd t o  tlic liead-qunrtcrs of the 
]Gig of Prussin, 311d n fourth \KIS i n  I'CSCI'W. Each unit carric(1 2'74 
English milcs of v-ire, with n certain nuinbcr of Xorsc recording tclc- 
graph iiistrunicnts and batteries, \sas' completc iii a11 its details, a~irl 
cnpnblc of erecting n line of clcctric tclcgrapli ns fast ns tlic ]lcn(~- 
r p r t c r s  of a n  army could mnrcli. 
Thus cquippcd, tlic Iicatl-qiiartcra of cncli Ammy appear to lln1.c 
bccn in constant con~mnnicnt~ion with Ikrlin, atid, through this Iattcy 
placc, with each otlicr. Tlic systcni adoptcd SCCIIIS to liavc bccil t o  
mnkc conncctions with tlic pcriiianent liiics of tlic country, arid to 
forni tciiipoiwy lincs as required, using tlic ficld cqiiipnicnt for tlio 
latter purposc, :is wcll :is to supply aiiy rlcficicncics nccurriirg in thc 
pcrmaueut liiics till tlic Iattcr hat1 befit repired. Till witliin thrcc or 
four days bcfow tlic bnttlc of Kijitigriitz, the tclegaphic npcratioiis 
appear to liarc bccn altvnys \wll advanced ; and tliouglt the wircs did 
not actunlly cstciid u p  to tlic field of bnttlc, t h e  can bc no do11bt 
that tlic clcctric tblcgrapli contributcd to the Priissian SIICCCSS in nn 
sinnll degrcc. Tliere nppcars to Iiavc bccn 110 clificiilty iu protecting 
tlic linc, ivhicli follon-ed thc milways (tlic iiinin lincs of c0inriiiinic:i- 
tion), and was conscqucntly \vcll gnnrdcd. 
KO sgstcni of visual signalling was uscd ill 5onnection with tlic 
clcctric tclcgrapli, citlicr during tlic Indinii niutiiiy or cluriug tlic cam- 
pniqn in  nohcmin, and up to tlic prcsciit, day, tlic Prussians Iiavc not 
nrganizcd any visual system. I t  is iny firm iiiiprcssion that h l  tlic 
.l'russians posscsscd a visual systcni during tlic Bollaninn campaiglr, 
they \\-auld hnvc been able to hnrc  conmmnnicntcd so inucli fnrthcr to the 
front on cncli line, that inucli of tltc 3nsiet.y a t  n critical moment of tiic 
battle of Koiiigriitz as to tlic position of tlic Arniy of tlic Croirii Priricc 
of Prussin, would Iiaw bccn nvoidcd. 
Again, for thc Abyssininn campaign of lSC7-8, thc tclcgrapli equip- 
incnt proritlcd  IS orgmizcd in two divisions, viz,, n light linc, fornictl 
of n light insulatcd clcctric cable, to bc laid as fast  ns the forcc 
ndvanccd, and of which n s@ciii of -i-isrial signalling fornmcd n part ; 
nnd n rc3cr1-c liiic, par'l.nll;ing niorc of n prriiiniiciit clinractcr, to br! 
crcctcd a t  Icisiirc in rcnr of tlic advniiciiig drmy. In conscqiicncc of 
wuit of transport, tlic light linc, with tlic csccption of tlic visual 
signalling apparatus, was nbnridonctl nltogcthcr ; arid for tlic SRIIIC 
reason great dificulty was cspcriciiced in carrying tlic nintcrials, cspc- 
cinlly tlic polcs, required for the semi-pcrnianciit linc, mid its cfiicicncy 
\rns conscquently seriously impaired. From tho C ~ U S C S  nieiitioncd, tlic 
progress of crcction \\'as ii~ucli doxrcr than it niiglit ]in\-c bccn ; mid 
whcn tlic linc was crectctl, considcrablc inconrcniciicc :iiitl intcrriiptiw 
to sigii:illiiig was cspcricmcctl: piiicipdly froin tlic 1 1 ~ ( ~ 1 l i i i i ~  tlo\vii of 
tlic iiinlie-shifts \vhic.li it. liect~nic iiwcssnry tn siibstitiitc for tclcgrap!i- 
Imsts., snitnblc p l c s  lint 1i:Lviiig bcen obt:iinablc i l l  tlic cniintry. Tliu 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
ns
 H
op
kin
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
0:3
8 1
1 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
Z l G  hIILTTAET TELEGRAPIiT Ah-D SIGNALLJNG. 
nunibcr of mcn availablc for working parties nppcars'nlso to  linve been 
wry limited; towards tlic end of tlic canipaip, when niore nicn \rere 
nvailnblc, ns much as ten miles ii-erc crectcd in n thy; tlicre sccnis to 
bc no doubt, tlicrcforc, tliaf, with adcquatc means, i t  might have been 
carried, if not absoliitcly n s  far as 3lagdala, very much iirater to it 
tlinri was nctnnlly done. Esccpt nt first, tlicrc appcars t o  Iia\-c been 
vcry littlc diniciilty conscqucut upon tlic iritcrfercncc of the Iiatircs 
with tlic Iiiic; their niotivcs for toucliing i t  nppcar to liarc becn 
ciiriosity, or :I wish to bcconic .tlic po~sessors of tlic copper wirc of 
yhicli it \\-as formed. The tclcgriiplicrs arid SigJlallCTs for \rOrliirig 
illis linc were, with tlic csccptioii or onc or two natives from Bombay, 
supplied from tlic Scliool of Xilitary Enginccriiig a t  Cliatliam. TKO 
Olliccrs a i d  37 Soii-CoiiimissioiIcd Officers and Inen (25 for tlic clectric 
tclcgrapli and 12 for x-isiial siyinlliiig) werit froin C1iath:ini. Tlic natives 
from Bonibny wcrc iiitcriclcd for working tlic stations in tlic plain, 
wlicrc tlic great lieat rciiclercd it undesirable to cniploy Europcans, 
Captaiii (tlicn Licuteunut) St. JoIiii,'E.l~., wns :ippoiiited by tlic Iiombay 
Crorernniciit to supcriiitcrid. tlic ~rliolc. IIc I i : d  been for some tinic 
cniploycd on that portion of tlic Indo-Europcaii tclegrnph passiug 
tlirorig.h Persia, mid w:is conscqucntly wcll qiialified for tlic duties 
rcquircd of Iiim. Xucli crcdit is duc to Captain St. Jolin, nnd the 
Oficers ajid nicn under his conmiand, by whom this linc was crccted, 
and who, by tlicir zcal arid cnergy, acconiplislicd n -iery great deal 
Jritli wry inadcqnatc means. 
Sotwitlistancling thc niimcroii~ drawbacks, occasioned .by faulty 
iiiatcrials cinploptl in tlic construction of this line, i t  proved itself of 
yery gwat value. 7,54S nicssiigcs were scnt by it from tlic time its 
erection was comnieiiccd till tlic tcrininntion of the campaign, a period 
of five months ; thc  linc was incmpletc niid in progress of estcnsioii 
(luring this tiiuc. This is cridencc of i ts  mluc. The risual signnlling 
apparatus \\*as carried to BIagdala, and was focnd of tlic ntniost iiso in 
tho trammission of intelligence 0 1 1  iiumeroiis occasions. 
, I Iiarc been iinablc to ol)taiii any nutlientic tk tn i l s  of thc tclegrapli- 
cquipnieiit employed in otlicr campaigns, \rIicrc this important adjunct 
to modern warfarc \\-as used. IVo linre, Iio~rcrer, suficicnt for our 
piirpose to cnnblc 11s to forin an opinion as to d i n t  tlic naturc of future 
military telegrapliic operations wonld be, :uid whnt kind of equipment 
we slioiiltl rcqiiia to ncconiplisli tlic w ~ r k  required, with tlic grcntcst 
ntlvant:igc, caw, mid rapidity. 
A line of clcctric tc1cgr;ipli is soiiicwlint in a siiiiilar position to :L 
rail\vay ns regards modcrn warfare, A force retiring tlirougli its ow11 
(11' a frknd1)- territory ~vould be in ful l  possession of both telegmplis 
mid railways, aiitl could UBC tliem to tlie utmost, and by thoroughly 
dcstroyiiig tlicni, \\-(~iild dcprivc aii enemy of all arlvnntagc to bo 
clcrivcd from tlicni till re-constructed. For clefensit-c purposes, therc- 
fore, N-C may fairly infer that tlie electric telegraph would be of very 
great ndvantagc, as admitting of tlic transmission of orders :iiid iiitelli- 
gcncc with n cclerity hitherto unattairiable. 
, An attacking force, on thc contrary, must bc prcpared to find every- 
thing i i i  tlio shape of railways and telcgrqdis a t  least only in n stnto 
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3IILlTAT.P TELEGEAPIIY AND SICN.iLLISG. 317 
of  ruin on tlic liuc of advaiicc, and must carry tlic 1iieaii.s of rc-cstnbliali- 
iug tlicni with tlic utmost rapidity, and ~ I i c i i  rc-cstnblislicd t h y  mist 
bc thontu;.hly pntrolled niid gnnrded to ciisiirc cflicicncj-. Thc mniu 
line of tclcgrnpli woiild be cstalilislied 011 the principal line of coinmu- 
nicntion with tlic bnsc of opcrntions, mliicli, m1tctIicr n rniln-ay or 
simply an ordiii:iry ro:itl, woitltl ncccssnrily bc niorc or lcss guarded, 
and thc sniiie guard that protcctctl tlic road, \rould protect tho telc- 
grnpli line. This rc1iiar!i is cspccinlly npplicnblc to n railway, tIic raluo 
of which, as n means of co~iiinriiiication with n bnsc of operations, ~ o u l t l  
i+scntinlly depend upon tlic eniciency of tllc protection nffordcd to it. 
Froni tlic cspcricnce of tlic Bolicniinn Cunipnign, it \rould sccni fair 
to nssiiiiie, that conibiiictl Iiiilitnrj- opcrations, by colitiiins moving oil 
1in.s a t  n coirsiderablc diatancc from cticli Otllcr, cnn bc carricd 011 by 
tlic aid of tlio electric tclegrnp!i and risunl sipalling, with infinitely 
wrcnter l)rccisioii niid certainty of result tlinii has liitlicrto been 1’0s- 
siblc. Again, it is 110 iiiconsidcrablc ntlvalitngc to bc nblc to transmit 
orders mid intelligciicc i n  n fcw Iiiinutt‘s orcr distances u-liicliJ under 
tho old &yim, conld not liar-c beeii ticcoinplisliccl s-ithout hours of 
1i:ird riding. 
\Vc iiow coiiic to tlic all-importnut point of tlic nnhirc of the equip- 
~iieiit requircd for servicc with nn army ciigngcd i i i  n campaign. 
llftcr n cnrcful consideration of tlic nature of tlic objects to bc 
nttniiictl, it  sccnis to mc tlint such an  equipiiicnt should consist of two 
tlivisioiis, n light line, cnpblc  of being put togctlicr as fast ns infantry 
cnii inarcli, a i d  of which n systcn-t of visual signalling slioiild form n 
part ; niid ;L rcscrrc or sciiii-l’eriiiaiiciit line, purtnking of the nnturc of 
nil ordinary civil liuc of tclcgmpli, for IIYC along tlic main linc of coni- 
iniinicntions to tlic bnsc of opcrations. 
. 111 carrying out the systciii decidcd on by tlieni, tlic Priissinns di-dc 
their light liiic iiito units, and in this rcspcct l r c  cnniiot do bcttcr tlinii 
follo\r tlicir esnmple. I\‘ith tlic csccptioii of n fcw unimportnnt dctails, 
the iiiiit of light liiic T\-liich seems best nrloptcd for 0111- sen-ice, is 
.\’cry IiiiicIi like the l’riissinn. d wry intcrestiiig nccniiiit of tlic 
I’riissinn IJicld Tclcgrapli is givcn by Captain I\‘cbbcr, RE. ,  in tlic 
sistccritli roliimc of thc Profcssionnl Papers of the Hop1  Eiigiricers, 
and n fnrtlicr detail of tho irnprovcmcnts introdiiccd sincc Cnpt:iiii 
Ircbbcr’s pnper was written, l ins  been furnished by Licutcnnnt S. 
hndcrson, X.E., \die ~ r n s  present during tlic field manceuvres of tlic 
1’rnssi.m Army last sumnicr. Tlic Prussinns consider their ficld tcle- 
gmp1i so importniit, that for tlie ni:incciivrcs in question, i t  was piit on 
n war footing. 
’ IVe linvc proposcd that our unit of Ficld Tc1cgr;ipll Equipnicnt, slioultl 
consist of tlircu trnrclliiig tclcgrapli ojfces, aiirl twclvc wirc n i id  storc 
wnggons, c:lrryiiig 3G Eriglisli iiiilcs of iiisulntctl wirc mid tlic nccessctry 
tools, Bc., for coustru&ioii.of tlic liiic ; tlicsc with thrcc gctigrd service 
~vaggo’olis, tlirec artificers’ wnggoiis and n field forge, complcto the 
cstnl)lishtiiciit. 
It is 
simply a siiinll oninibiis nioiintcd 011 springs, drawn by t iTo Iiorscs, 
cnrrjiiig tu-o M o r x  recording tclcg.lni)li.iiistriiiii~iit~ O I I :L s n ~ ~ l l  tnblc, 
3. 
TIic foriii of trawlling tclcgrnpli onicc is show~i in Fig. 1. 
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318 ' AIILTTAEY TXLEGRAPIiT AXD STQNAT,T,TXiC. 
always rcndy to coninicncc work tlic iiioincnt tlic cnrtli arid litic \rircs 
arc attached. Two telegraph batteries, of n form dcsigncd by Quarter- 
tnnstcr Scrgcnnt J. Mntliieson, R.E., n iiiodidcntioti of Daniel's form, 
arc nlwnys in position undcr thc tnblc cnrryiug tlic instrrimcnts, :lnd 
rcndy for work. Four spnrc Jlorsc tclcgrapli iristrunietits, t x o  recording 
ant1 tu-o sounding, and two spnrc'bnttcrics arc cnrricdin cadi travcIIing 
ofIicc, to supply dcficiencics, nnd to cnnblc branch lines to bc throlyn 
out if rcquircd. Besides tliese, n set of visnal signalling apparatus, 
tools of rnrious ltinds for tlic rcpnir of tho linc nncl of thc instruments 
tlieniselrcs ; earth plates, wliicli arc simply plates of coppcr for csta- 
blishiiigcnrtli conncctions to complctc tlic clcctricnl circuit; n tcnt, 
smnll set. of cooking utensils, and picket ropes, kc., f w  tlic Iiorscp, 
form n part of tlic equipment of this ~rnggon, so that if dctnclicd, as it 
110 doubt often wonld be, the mcii nttnclicd to it would bo :iblc to shift 
for tlicnisclvcs. This waggon I\-odd also cnrry thckitv atid arim of tho 
Inen, tlic lnttcr Iiowcvcr iu such n position as to bc rcadily nvnilablc a t  
n nionicnt's noticc in casc of emergeiicy. This ~mggoii, with storcs 
coiiipletc, wciglis 22 c d .  
To cacli oflice-\raggoti arc attaclicd thrcc tclcgrnplicrs, oiic drircr and 
onc spare man, tlic latter to assist gcncrnlly iii  pitching ant: striliiiig 
camp, cooking, &e., wiieii on detaclied dutics. 011 tlic niarch, csccpt 
on vcry bad roads, tho iiicn would be carried on tlic \rnggoii; thc 
limbcr box in front affording tlicni rooni to sit. Tlic objcct of this is 
to bring tlic tiicii into cnnip frcdi, as tlicir dutics n-ould cornnicncc just 
when tliosc of otlicr soldicrs \rcrc, as n riilc, over. Tlic Prussinns n t  
first.mountcd tlicir tclcgraphcrs on horscbnck, but they found that, 
ovcn in this way, tlicy werc not suficicntly frcsli for their \vorli, and 
it cnt:ii!cd n further addition .of iiicn siiiiply to look nftcr the tek- 
gmplicrs' Iiorscs. Undcr tlicir prcscnt systcni, tlic Prussians carry tlicir 
tCk!gmIJllCrS in n sort of cabriolet, drnmi by two Iiorscs, but I prcfer 
carrying tliein on the tclcgrapli. oficc itsclf, as t h y  would thus bc 
d r a y s  close'to tlicir \I-orIi. I slionld prefer, if ncccssarr, putting four 
Iiorscs into thc tclcgrnpli oflicc, and carrying tlic nicn on it, to carrying 
them iii n scpnrntc cnrringc. By such an nrrungcmcnt wc should not 
rcquirc niorc liorscs tlinn undcr tlic prcsent, Prnssinn systcin, nnd wc 
sliould still rcqiiirc fcwcr than if tlic nicn rode. IIitlierto u-c 11nrc 
found two Iiorscs suflicicnt. Tlic springs innkc an citornioiis diffcrcncc 
in the draught. Oric of tliese tclcgrnpli ofliccs conipletc, iritli tlic nicii 
tiiountcd on tlic v-:iggoii, wciglis nbout 25 cwt., get I linrc sccti two 
horses tnke this load along easily and witliout showing tlic slightest clis- 
tress, wliilc four, on tlid sniiic road, with n load of 32 cwt., on n carri:igc 
witlioiit springs, m r c  crideiitly obligcd to iisc niiicli greater exertion. 
A traveIling office complctc ninrched from Cliatliam to Cnntcrbnt-y, n 
clistancc of 27 miles, in 5; hours, without distress to tlic pair of liorscs 
drawing it. 
Wc Iism adoptcd tlic Xorsc forni of tclcgrapli instrument, bccausc, 
by it, cvery message is rccorded, a mnttcr not to be slightly regarded 
in tlie trnnsmissioii of militnry orders. Probably for tlic sniiic rcnson, 
this form of telegrnpli instrumcnt lias bceri recentlr ndoptecl by all 
Continental armies for tlicir field cqiiiptncnt. Iknring in mitid tlie 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
ns
 H
op
kin
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
0:3
8 1
1 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
.
 
......... 
_
- .
 
-
. 
........ 
-
-
 
-__
 _
-_
 
...... 
-_
 ..
..
 
D
o w
n l
o a
d e
d  
b y
 [ J
o h
n s
 H
o p
k i n
s  U
n i v
e r s
i t y
]  a
t  2
0 : 3
8  1
1  J
a n
u a
r y
 2 0
1 5
 
XILTTARP T m E c R m n i -  ASD STCPI’ALLIXC. 319 
~~eccssity for simplicity in all coiincctcd with thr! condnct of warlikc 
opcrations, we have cndc:?voured to do nivay, as far as possible, with 
all delicato complications of construction, such as attachcd galvano- 
~neters, conucctiona for translation of niessagcs, kc., .crIiile a t  thc 
panic tinic they liarc been arranged to pack iii thc smallest possiblc 
compass for stowage and transport. T h y  arc, niorcorcr, verj- light. 
Thcy are adapted for use with battery pomw or with a magneto- 
induction ciirrciit ; and as sounders as well as rccording instruments. 
Thc object of using these instruments as sounder$, is to economiso tho 
p p c r  strips on which tlic messages arc rccordcd ; it  would bo unnc- 
ccssag  to record unimportant messages, for csamplc tlioso giriiig 
iiistructious for tho working of tlic liuc niiglit fairly bc scnt by sound 
witlioiit inconvenience. Tho Norse sounding instruments are similar 
to tho others, witliout clockwork or recording nrraiigenients, aiid arc 
iiitciidcd for use in tlic csamiiiation or construction of the liiic, and for 
nny other purposes wlicrc it is no€ necessary to record tho mcssagcs. 
Tlicso instrumcnts Iiavc been tried by knocking tliciii about both on 
])aek-s:iddlo and ~vlicclcd transport, and Iiitlicrto they Iiavc only been 
disarranged by tlic shaking, to such an esteiit, that n few turns of thc 
adjusting screws hare mad0 then1 ready for work ill tivn or tlircc 
ininntes. Thcy xerc made by Mcssrs. Sicuicns, Brothcrs, of Charlton, 
from general ideas sketched out for tlicm, and aro very cscellcnt spcci- 
iiicns of w-orl;~nnnsliip. 
The telegraph battcrics employed, n-cro specially dcsigned for tho 
equipment by Quartermaster Sergeant Nnthicson, R.E. They arc 
n form of Danicl’s battery, that is to say, zinc and copper plates in n 
saturated solution of sulpliate of copper. Tlio improrements due to 
Quartermaster Sergeant Mathieson am t1ic:compact form of tlic cell 
and tlic arrangement to prevciit tho cscapo of tho liquid in case of 
an upsct. This latter is attained by corering in the top, leaving only 
n small pinIiolc for thc escape of tho gas generated by the action of 
thc battery. Wo Iiam tried these batteries against tho NariL-Da~y 
form, used by tho Prnssians for their field equipment. For thc first 
day or two, tho Pruasian battery prored slightly thc best, but nftcr 
that, Nntliieson’s beat it, and after a few days, the Prussian battery 
was nowhcre ; in fact, it  required to bo touched up and put to  rights, 
while JIathicson’s remained as good as eyer for work. This circum- 
stance, together with certain other defects inseparable from thc 
Marid-Dary form of battery, onc of d i ich  is the  soldcring on of the 
copper strip, conuecthg tho plates, to the carbon element, nu opcra- 
tion which would be extremely difficult in tlic field, has induced us to 
adopt 1I:itliicsoii’s as tlic form of battery for our equiplncnt. This 
battery has been tried severely both by pact-saddle aud wlicclcd 
transport, aiid has stood the rough usage and shaking rcmarliably well. 
These batteries liavo been iiiarlo for us by thc Indian Rubber, Outta 
P e r c h ,  and Tclcgrapli 1Vorl;s Company of North l\roolu7ich, and aro 
cstremdy \re11 finished. 
Thc cartll-plates are of obloug foim and inadc of copper. They 
arc 1s inches long, G J  iuclics wido n t  the top and tapering to n breadth 
of 3J incl!cs a t  tlic point. They are capablo of being used either by 
YOL. XIY. 2 i  
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320 JIILITARY TELEGRAPIIY AND SIONALLIXQ. 
digging n liolc and burying tlicni, o r  by driving n stroil5 iron wedge of 
siniilar sltapc into tlic ground and subsequently slipping tho copper 
earth-platc iuto thc liolc SO formed. A sinall barrel of water is  
carried witli the  waggou t o  pour on tlic carth-connections when the 
ground is wry  dry. ‘I‘hc circuit from tiic earth-plates to  thc instru- 
ments is  niadc by  n coppcr wire. 
set of small tools for repair of the telegraph instrumcnk, arranged 
in n lenthem roll, also sonic sparc springs, &c., arc carried in tlic 
trnvclling oficc. 
Tlic only otlicr speciality couvcycd in this carriage, i s  n s c t  of day 
and niglit signalling apparatus, tlic naturc of irhieli will be dctailcd 
in treating of visual signalling. Tlic otlicr articles arc simply n sclcc- 
tion of smitlis’, tinsniitlts’, atid carpenters’ tools, of tlic naturc required 
in the construction of n line of telegraph, also n spade, pickaxe, crow- 
bar, junipers, &., wliicli, wit11 n tciit nut1 camp cquipnicnt, completes 
tlic airangemcnt. 
Tlic wirc and s tow waggon, Fig. 2, is n four-wlicclcd carriage 
iiiouiitcd on springs, dcsigned to carry tlircc miles of insulatcd mirc 011 
six drums, with tlic iicccssary tools and apparatus for tlic constructioii 
of n Iinc of tclegrapli. Eigliteeu liglit iron telegraph-poles and n light 
Iadder lie in t11c spacc bctwccn t h e  r o ~ s  of drums. Tliese poles aro 
intended for use at  road-crossings, wlicrc constant supcrincumbciit 
trntlic \rould in timo destroy tlic insulation of tlic wire. Undcr ordi- 
~ i n r y  circumstnnces, it is simply Inid on tlic surface of tlio ground; a t  
minor crossings i t  may bo buried, n very small trcncli being quitc SUE- 
cicnt to secure i t  from irijury. Two linibcr boscs on tlic front of this  
wrnggon carry tlic small stores for t h c  construction of thc line as \vcll 
as tlic a r m  and kits of thc men, the  former, as bcforc, rcadily nccrs- 
siblc in c a w  of cuicrgency. Tltcsc limber boscs also form seats for 
the iiicn whcn n forced march beconies necessary. A liglit wliecl- 
barrow is carried bcneatli this waggon t o  enable tlic line to be paid 
out iti situations mlicrc the  waggon itself could not go. d cauvas 
c o w r  is  drawn o m -  tlic wholo whcn not  in use. Tlic weiglit of this 
caniagc complete, is  32 cwt. 
Tlic conducting \n‘rc is  n most important item in any  Iinc of tele- 
graph. For tlic cquipmcnt x c  1ia-i-c selcctcd n strand of 3 No. 20 
copper xire, insulatcd nit11 Indian-rubber t o  n diameter of +is of 
aninch, and with nu outer corcring of tnrrcd tapo laid ou in  tFo 
tliicknesscs with n long twist, tho first in ono direction and tlic second 
in tlic opposite, by wlticli incans considerable tcnsilo strcngth is  
obtained. Two nicn pulliig witli all tlieir miglit at a piccc of this 
insulatcd irirc, tlic elid of which was made fast to  n L.cd point, failed 
t o  break or evcn do i t  any apparent injury. This gives n practical 
iden of its tcitsilc strcngth. Indian-rubber lias bccii selected for tho 
insulnting material, in conscqucncc of i t s  great  resistancc to injury. 
We l p v e  had every g u n  aud mggon  of a field battery of artillery, as 
TPCU as of tlic A, or poutoon, troop of tlic Royal Enginccr Train pass 
over this insulatcd wire, laid ou n hard h t y  road, witliout doiugit oily 
B parent injury. Some of tho pontoon w~~ggoiis, wliich wcrc uf tlic 
b P d pattcru, \vcigh complctc inoro tlinu two and n quarter tons. T l i i q  
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XILITARY TELEGRAPIIT Ah’D SIQNALLIXO. 321 
is proof positirc of its rcsistaiicc to injury if ncccssarily subjcctcd to 
such iisagc. Eitlicr I100p~r’s corc, now i o  n-cll kiiowu as n di-electric 
for submarinc cnl)lt!s, or Gray’s corc, iiinuufactnretl by tlie Tiidinn- 
rubbcr, Glut tn-pcrclia, aiid Tclcgrapli llrdi~ C’ompnny, KortIi l\rool- 
with, tlic latter sonicn-lint similar in constixctin*j to tltc fo~uier, and 
20th being conibinntions of vulcaiiized Intliaii I ubbcr, nrc cxccllcnt for 
the purposc reqnircd. Tlic first Prussinn ficltl cquipncnt mas fitted 
with n conducting wirc insulntcd with giittn-pcrcha, with an outer pro- 
tecting covering of cop1)ci- tapc, and dcsipcd to bc laid on the ground. 
TIiis is nii esccllcnt combination, if, d ~ c n  OIICC Inid don-n, i t  cnll bc 
allo\ved to rcinaiii ; and for short submarinc cables it is mucli U S C ~  by 
tlic Austri:in.;, to coimcct tho islands in tlic Adriatic, wit11 cscellcllt 
cffcct. If, liowcvcr, it is constantly coilcd up and pniid out agaill 
it docs iiot niiqvcr, tlic guttn-l)crclin soou beconics brittle by dry 
licnt mid cracks tlnriug tlic proccss of constivctiug n line, lcnviug tllc 
conductor bare, and cniiscqueiitly no loiigcr iiisulntcd. Tlic 1)nss”ag~ 
of n waggon orcr tlic Prussiaii wire is fatal. It was hied,  jvitll 
scrcral otlicr speciiiicns, ill n similar ~iinuiicr to tlie cable adoptcd by 
us, but tlic first gun wliicli passcd orcr it, clcstroycd tlic iusulotioii 
bcyoiid repair. Tho Pruisians linrc siiicc discarded this form of con- 
ductor in fnrour of an air linc carried on poles. This Iattcr, Iiowcycr, 
posscsscs sonio scrious defects, ono of wliicli is that the gcncrnl linc is 
not sufficiently high to pcrruit n xiountcd niau to pass freely undcr; it 
also tnkcs n niucli longer timc to  construct than n ~ T O U U ~  linc, a ~ i d  
is quitc a s  easil5 dcsfroycd by a11 cncmy, nud is more conspicuous. 
After duc consideration, wc linvc tliercforc dccidcd to adopt a ground 
linc. 
To foivi n lino with the iusiilntcd wire dcscribcd, it is only ncccssory 
t o  pay i t  out from tlic ~aggoi i ,  or, wlicrc tlic waggon cnunotpnss, from 
n ~iaiid-bnrrox~, and let i t  lio on tlic ground. J\‘Iicu tbc wire 011 onc 
drum is cspcndcd, tliat on tlic nest is at taclicd to it by n wry ingenious 
couucctor iiircntctl by Qunitcrniastcr Scrgcnut JIntliicson, R.E. By 
this little apparatus an insulated joint niay be madc by n practiscd iiian 
iii Icss tliaii n minute. Tlic sccontl druiii of wiro is tlicii paid out 
siiiiilnrly to tlic first, and tlic snnic proccss is continucd till all arc 
cnipticd. 
Light irou polcs arc cnrricd to support thc mire across roads abutting 
on that along which tlic felegrapli is constivcted. Thcsc poles aro 
luadc of tubular iron iii two lciigths: tho lower Iciigtli is 1 iucli iii 
iritciiial dinnicter, 10 feet long, a i d  furidslicd with n solid-pciutctl 
shoc a t  one cud to cnablc it to bc piislied iuto tlic jiroiind. Tlic top, 
which is 9 fcct long and 5 t h  of an inch in cstcrunl diauietcr, fits for 
transport iiisidc tlic Ioirer portion. For use it is taken out, rcrcrsed, and 
tlic two parts fitted togctlier with kind of bayonct-socl+. ai-rangc- 
melit, foruiing a po1c 18 fcct long. A wooden catch to carry tlic n-iro is 
puslied into tho top of the pole and two cord guys arc fastcucd to 
tliumb-scrctw attached to it within 2 fcct of tlic top ; Iioles arc mndc 
ivitli n jrrmpcr, a t  the positions \vlierc tlic polcs arc to stnud on tach 
sick nf the road ; the \virc i s  fisctl nftcr mcnsuring tlic distancc bctu-crlk 
the. s i rppr t s  a i d  ncljnating it, so that it slid1 wither bc too tight 1101‘ 
2 h 2 
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322 MILITARY TELEGEAPnT AND SIGNA\LLIHU. 
too slack, and the ~ O I C S  a r ~  raiscd togctlicr  id cadi pu4icil into its 
respcctivo jumpcr holc. Tlic guys arc tlicn mndc fast to t1v.o il.oll 
pickets, ouo on cacli side and n littlc rctircd from tho road to bo 
crossed, and tlic conducting wire itsclf is made fast to n third iron 
picket, so as directly to take UP tho strain 011 tlic wire suspcndcd over 
the road. U7it11 practiscd men n pair 
of polcs can bc put togctlicr aud crected, with wire suspcndcd, gllys 
made fast, and cvcrytliing coniplctc, iu from tlircc to four ininntcs. 
Each wiro ant1 store waggou carrics one Son-Comniissioncd 0fliccr 
and six nicii. Thcso waggons ~vorlc in pairs, OIIC lays tllc liiio Ivirc 
continnoiisly wide tlic sccond follows aiitl erects tlio poles. Each Noll- 
ComniissioIicd oniccl. and man lins n particular duty told off to hiill, 
and tlic wliolc has bceu rcduccd to n rcgular systcm of drill. In forl11- 
itig the line, tIic ~oti-Comii~issio~ictl Oficcr in clinrgc tests tho continuity 
of tlic circuit :it tho cnd of c ~ r y  Iinlf-milc, fitid also, by niCaiis of Iiis 
soundiiig iiistrouicnt, is nblc to convcy my information to tho point 
from whence the line started aiid to rccairc tltc saiiio iki return. 111 
this way n continuous coniiiiuiiicatioii could be I q t  up, if rerjuircd, 
from tho momcnt tlic liuc startcd from tlio initial point ; it would oiily 
bc ncccssary t o  lcnrc n iiiouutcd ~oii-CouiiiiissioIled Olliccr a t  tlic cntl 
of the first half-niilc till tlic sccond was paid out, wlicn tlic two could 
bc joined togctlicr nnd lie could trot o i l  to tlic front, n second iion- 
coniniissioncd Oficcr taking up .z positioii at the end of tho second 
half-inilc till tlio third Iiad bccn paid out, atid so on, ntl it$i)~itum. 
N n n y  systcnis linvo bccii devised with n viow of liecping up tclc- 
gr;ipliic coniniunication by conrcrting the dice1 of tlic waggon carry- 
ing the tclegnpli iiistrunicnts, into an cnrtli coniiection, but tlicrc aro 
niaiiy dificulties to be overcoiiic. At best, the cartli conncctioii ob- 
taiiicd can only be n wry indiffcrclit nicans of coinplctiiig aii clcctrical 
circuit as compared with a properly constitutcd cartli-p'atc, and siiclt 
n combination introduccs complications wliiclt aro not dcsirable iu any 
military cqiiil~mcnt. 
In certain situations, as for csainple in carrying n Iinc tlirongli n 
villngo or tlirougli \\-00t1, atlvnutagc riiay be ta!icIi OF \\*dls 01' trccv 
for suspending tlie wire in positions wiicrc it is dcsirnblc that i t  slioiilil 
bc raiscd above tlic ground. For this purpose cacli wiro ~vnggon carrics 
n ccrtnin riunibcr of iron lioOkS, whicli arc capable GF bcing linmmcrcd 
into malls or t r c s ,  and on wliicli the wiro iiiay be suspcn(1cd. I u  this 
This is mado in two 
parts, connected by n liingc, so as to form n stcp-ladder ; when n grcntcr 
lciigtli is rcquired thc two pii-ts arc puslicd up into one coiitinuons 
Icugtli, and fastcncd togcthcr by nicans of keys, tlius forming n Iaddcr 
18 fcct lotig. This Inddcr lins bccii foulid cstrcincly uscful a i d  Iinndg. 
:I light \vliccl-bnrron-, arraugcd to carry a siitglc driini with its wire, 
forins also n part of tho cqnipnicnt of the wirc imggon. Tlic object of 
this :ipparatus is to ciiablc tlic wire to be paid out in situations wl~crc 
the wire wa~goii  tsclf could not trawl. Tlic front of tliiv u-hcel-barrow 
is fitted with 111 ey?, iiito \vliicli n lasso can bc Ii~olicd, so that IIOMC- 
pou-cr may nlmaj-s be applied in dmwing it. Wlierc the groii~id is 
This coruplctcs the opcmtiou. 
\v.:ty polcs limy frcqucntly bc snwd. 
d light larldcr is carried in each irirc waggoit. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
ns
 H
op
kin
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
0:3
8 1
1 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
MILITART TELEGRAPIIY AXD SIGNALLING. 323 
so steep or rougIi tIint i t  is inipracticiablc to usc’tlic w ~ i c e ~ b a r r o ~ ,  :L 
driitii of wire is placed oii an iron spindlc, and carried by two iiicn, oiic 
on ~ a c l i  side, ant1 paid out ns tlic men more forlvard. TIiis spindlc has 
been found iiiorc Iiaiidy and easily Trorlxd t l ini i  n liaiid-barrow, wliicli 
ivns  a t  first used with tlic equipmcut. The men prefer it: ~vliicli is n 
good criterion of its advantages for practical use. 
Uy tlic process described, n liiic of teleg~xpli niny bc constructed at  
tlic rate of from 2:- to 3 miles nil hour; with very \re11 practiscd mcu, 
: i d  oii n good r o d ,  n speed of iicnrly 4 miles aii hour has been 
:ittailled; but I prclcr tlic smaller figures, as t1iey;givc n better iden of 
tlic nrcragc speed n.liic11 niny bc kept up rmder ordinary circuui- 
stnnccs. 
111 dismantling‘ n liiie, tlic operations describcd for its coiistructioii 
arc simply rcrerscd. Tlic wire uxggous, as before, ~ o r k  iii pairs- 
OIIC goes in front, with its working party, aud ttikes domn the polcs, 
\rliicli arc quickly stowed nivay in their propcr places, wliilc tlic second 
folloirs and reels up tlic wire. Xong  n road, or on any grouiid ivlicrc 
tlic wire waggou cau travel, this process of rccliiig up is pcrforuicd 
niccliaiiically by n very ingenious arrniigciiicnt, designed by Troop 
Sergenut-Major Willinins, of thc Royal Enginccr Train. It coiisists of 
;I vrilcaiiizcd Iudinu-rubber or lcatliern strap, working round. a drum, 
attached to one of tlic hind wliecls. As tlic carriage niorcs forward, 
this strap convcys motion from thc wliccl t o  n pulley in connection 
with n clutch, ivliicli latter fits into n corresponding nrmngcuicnt on tho 
end of tlic spindle, carrying tlic rear druiii of tlic \vuggoi~, to which 
tlic rotatory motion of tlic wliccl is thus conveyed. As thc wirc is 
gradually reeled up, i t  is easily understood lion7 tlic dianictcr of tho 
drum on wliicli i t  is coiled, g-radually iiicrcnscs. To obvintc any bad 
rcsrilts u-liicli this circumstnncc would ueccssarily cntnil, tlic apparatus 
i.j so ai-rangcd that, wlien commencing to rccl up on an empty drum, 
each rcvolutioii of tho latter mny just coil tlio wirc up as  fast ns tlic 
waggo11 ariv;tilct?g, tlic a s h  of thc drum being then a t  its mininium. 
As tlic plies of wirc 31‘0 gr:idtinlIy ~ v o u u d  on tlic diameter of thc aslc 
iiicrcnscs, and cncli rcvolutioii \vould conscqucntly, after n littlc time, 
tnkc 111) niorc tliaii the length required in proportjon to tlic adraiicc of 
tlic wnggon ; this contingency is provided for by n lever in connection 
with tlio clutch, by whicli tlic latter cnii bc thrown into or out of gear 
at  n moimut’s notice. Ii‘lien tlic wirc is gcttiug recledup too quickly, 
tlic apparatus is thrown o!it of gear, tlic rcvolution of tlic drum censes, 
aud tlicwirc is not reeled up at all. Whcn n sufficient auiouiit of slack 
Itas bccii left bcliiiid, tlie apparatus is, by incans of tlic lever, thrown 
iuto gear, nud tlie reeling up, rccommcnccd. Practically this arrange- 
iiicut has been found t o  work rcmnrkably well, and, with ire11 pmc- 
tiscd nicn, n very littlc use of the lever is required, til: tlie very cud of 
the length of wirc is nearly rcaclicd, wlicn of course the diameter of 
tlic drum is a t  its ninsinium. 
In dismantliug n liuc of field electric telcgrapli, each man lias a 
specific duty to perform, aud tlic ~vliolc is, as in the case of tlic con- 
struction of n Iiric, rcduced to :t siiuplc systcni of drill ; n liiic mny be 
dismautlcd uorc qrlicldy thau i t  cnu Lo formcd, :uid tlic average for 
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321 JIILITARY TELEGRAPHY hh’D !3IGNALLISG. 
tlik operation (disiimntling), iiiay be put d o ~ i  at iiearly fow iiiilcs ail 
hour. 
A suggestion of Nr. Lombard, one of tlie ciiyloy’s a t  tlic 1:oyaI 
Enginccr Office a t  the I’crrnancnt Barracks, Aldershot, is \rcll worthy 
of consideration. I tc proposcs to providc 10 uicii, citlier cavalry or 
infantry, for cach mile of line, each man to carry 200 yards of insu- 
Iatcd conducting wire, iiiakiiig :I tot:il of 2,000 yards, or, n con- 
sidcrablo ainomit of slack ~~roiitd bc rcquircd in practice, roughly, 0110 
inilc for the 10 men. To forni n linc, each man would lay out his 
200 yards of wire in tlic direction re(pircd, in siicccssioii, colinccting 
it carefully to that of his iicst neiglibonr. In this wny it is easily 
iindcrstood liow n liiio of telegraph nuglit be very quickly constllictcd, 
or still iuoro re:idily dismantlcd, tlic lattcr n most importaut matter 
in the c w u t  of n sudden retreat becoming iicccssary. A Xoli-Com- 
missioiicd Officcr, in cIiargc of each 10 men, carries n portable tclc- 
gr:ipli histiumcnt, which Iic attaches, u-itli ail carth connection a t  tlie 
ciid of tlic liiic, and by wliicli iiicssagcs inay bc rcceivctl or trans- 
iiiittcd with facility. Tliis niode of operation i, uot applicable to the 
construction of n main or ci-cIi a priricipnl briiiich line of telegraph, 
wliicli could be more cflicieiitly doiie, at  :i sufliciciitly rapid ratc, by 
means of the waggous of the equipmait. It is, bon-ewr, i-cry appli- 
c n l h  to such work as follojriug up n rccoiinaissaiicc pushed forward, 
to convcy iiitclligciico tlicrefrom to tlic head-qaartcrs of ail Army. 
Its cliicf defect is tho number of joints or coriucctions iiccessarily 
made, cadi to n ccrtahi cxtcnt productive of thc cliancc of iutcrriip- 
tioii ; theso must conscquently be put togcthcr with grcat caw. 
This proposition 113s uot yct bccii tricd, but n report aiid estimate 
lias bceii forwarded to thc IVar Office, and as tlic siini rcquircd to bc 
cxl)cn(lcd is not great, i t  is to bc liopcd that ah  experiment ~nzy  be 
madc. 
Tlic other ~ a g g o n s  of tlic cquipnicnt, viz., tlic field forge, artificers, 
and gcncral scrvicc n~aggoiis, Iinw iiotliiiig spccial in thck qe::txiciioii, 
: i d  iiccd not, therefore, bc described. Tllny s?ifiuid, Iio\vcvcr, bc :ill 
monntetl ou tho samc rrlieck, and proTided witli thc samc axlcs’ :is 
tlie carriagcs of tlic Royal Eiiginccr Train, x-iz., 5 ft. liiud, m i d  3 ft. 
G in. fore wkccls; viclth of tirc, 3 in., roiuid iron aslcs, witli tliird 
class mns of Ayshforil’s patttcrn, 2nd a, 5 ft. S in. track. 
111 dcsigiiing the tclcgrnph iiistriiiiiciits for thiscquipmcnt, simplicity 
lias bcc~i a l ~ n y s  Iiept c:ircfully iii yicw, bccnusc it is essential that 
dclicate or complicated arrangcrne~its should be a-ioidcd iu warlike 
operations. dl1 dclicatc ga1r:iiionietcrs and couucctions recording and 
passing 011 n message, callcd in tclcgrupliic la~iguagc translation, 
Iin\-c bccn omitted, not from any want of appreciation of tho n l u c  of 
such combinations, but simply to ciisurc simplicity. It is probable 
tlint tlic more delicate instiunicuts might be used with advantage on 
tlic iuaiii Ihic, if, when once put in position, they coiild bc allowctl to 
remniu undisturbed for n considcrtiblc time, and for which service 
spccial iustrumcnts might bc provided. 11s an instaucc, lion-ever, of 
tlic ncccssity for simplicity, I may nicntiou t l in t  thc att:iclicd gi lmiio-  
iuetcra aud other more clclicatc combinations of the iiistnuiiciits scut  
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bhi,fTATLP T E L E O I ~ ~ P I ~ Y  M’D SIGNAtLlSG. 326 
init to Abyssinia sooii got out of order, :uid bccanic absolute 
soiirccs of tlitEciilty aiitl trouble, and Captaiin St. Jolin, It.E., in his 
report on thc telcgrapliic operations of that campaign, recommends 
that for futurc military service, all attached g;ilvariomcters and other 
complications should be omitted. The telegraph instruments sent to 
Abrssinin were siniple Jlorsc rccnrdiiig instrunientu of tlic ordinary coni- 
incrcial pattern, aiitl not in any n-ay specially fitted for military scrvicc. 
I IIO\I- pass 011 to the vi.w%l signalling apparatiis, which i t  is pro- 
posed should form n pnrt of each unit of field telegraph equipincut. 111  
order to cffcct thc objects iii vie\\-, prorisioii must Lc made for day atid 
night signalling, a id  by iiieatis .?F this apparatus, thc very important 
part of commuiiication \yitli n co-opcrating nnvul force, must a!so be 
Imforincd. 
For day sipalliitg, flags 4 feet sqiiarc, on poles as light as tlicy cau 
bc made coiisistctit witli strength, Iiavc bccn adopted. Tho flags 
arc eitlicr ciitircly black and ciitircly white, or black and whitc com- 
billed, to suit cwry mricty of bncl;gromid. Tlio iiicssngcs arc sent by 
COLIC, tlic code used Lciiig :I coiubiuntiou of the original Army code ant1 
tlic S:ival cotlc for boat scrvicc; i t  is entitled “ Tlir driny ant1 S:iry 
Code,” and is publislicd by authority, and issued to IIer Majesty's ships 
mid to all military statioiis. ‘rlic iiumbers arc sent by long ant1 shry; 
wnvcs of n flag, a long ivaro indicating n dasli (-), or loug oleniciit, 
and n short wnvc n dot (.), or short clement. Tl\eso‘ dots aiid daslics 
are siniilar to tlicrsc of the ordiiiary Blorsc Telcgrapli Alpliabct. Tlic 
i~urnbcrs nsed to trmsmit tlic codc messages arc ns follon-s :- 
1. . 
5. . . 
4. . . . .  
r).  . . .  
i). . . . . .  
C. - 
7. . - 
8. - . 
a. . * 
0. - . .  
- 
‘fiiese, with n fcw c0mbinatio:is of dots mid tlaslics, iitdicntiiig ccr- 
t:iiii special call-sigiinls, arc all t h t  is iicccssnry for tho traiiuiiiissioii of 
:iny nicssagc that niay bc required. In additioii to tlic gciicral code, 
d i ic l i  consists of groitps of j h r  figures, tlicrc is n slielli~ig. COLIC, 
embracing ccrtaiii corribiii:~tioiis of Ictters int1ic:itcd 1)y groiips of t h e e  
figiircs, tlic last Iii~n~lrctl I I I I I I I ~ L ‘ ~ P ,  from 900 to 999, beiiig tlcrotctl to :t 
codc of such ~ o r d s  as ‘‘ all, the, or,’’ kc., an :iriiiy cvolritioiiary code 
(ciubracing also n few incssagcu csclitsircly for sigii:dlcrs), indicated 
by groups of less t l im t h e e  figures ; also n list of tlic miiibcrs of Her 
Nnjest,y’s ships, an Iiornrj- code, n gcographicnl code, to  be filled in for 
local iianics, and cal):iblc of bciitg adapted to tlic particular district for 
which tlic codc is required, ant1 an allhabet, irliich is tlic same as  
that used for spelling :t message, without n coils, ii; ITcr Xajcsty’s 
Knvy. Tlierc is also n Loat evolutionary code, coiisistiiig of groups of 
less thc(n three figures ; tlic cliaiiccs bciiig considcrably against tlic 
Army c\-olutiouary and boat codes liciug reqiiircd to bc used together, 
tlicy linrc each becii arranged for ~ I Y J U I ) ~  of Icss t h L  tlircc figures. 
Sliould ail csccptional cnsc OCCIII’, iti which it was iieccssary to itsc tlia 
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two togctlier, n prcconccrtcd prclimiiinry sigiial woulil pcvclit any 
confiisioii ; for boat servicc tlicrc i s  also n conipass codc. 
T i m  d l  not adinit of my going niinntcly into tlic mode of using 
this code hook, but full directions are givcii iii the book itself, as wcll 
as in tho i\Iannnl of Instruction of drniy 2nd Xavy Signalling, pub- 
lishcd by authority. 
For nig)t-sigualling, lainps must be cmploJ-e-ecl. Thcsc l i n ~ c  bccii 
nrmngcd In n portable foriii, nud nro constructed to sliow long and 
short flnslics of light, corrcsponding to tlic loiig nntl short waws 
of tlic flag for day-signalling. Tlic light is produced by tlirowii!g :I 
;L jct of Guc pow.kr, coni~ioscd cf n mixture of powdered rnaguesiiiin, 
powdcrcd rcsiii, and Ij-colmdirini tlirougli tlic flainc of n spirit-hiup, 
and is of nu estrciiiely brilliant nnturc. This n1ixtm.c is bIo\vu, as it 
~rc rc ,  through tlic flame by mcaus of n pair of bcllo\rs workcd by Iinud. 
Tlic powder is composcd of the ninterials mcutioncd in certain propor- 
tions; it is numbercd from 1 to 4, according to qualitj-. KO. 1 COII- 
tninu 1. of lycopodium, 1 of resiii, :uid 1 of powdcrcd mngucsiuiii; 
Xo. 2, 1 of lycopodium, 1 of resiii, and 2 of poylcrcd mngncsiiiiii; 
KO. S, 1 of l~-copodiurn, 1 of rcsin, and ;i of powlcrcd mngncsiuni ; and 
No. 4, 1 of 1jcopodiuni, 1 of resin, and .i of pon-tlcrcd iiiagncsiuiii. Tlic 
light is most brilliant wlicii tlic quantity of iiingiicsiiiiii is grcntcst ; 
No. 4 ia tlicrefore arrnngcd to be used for actual scrvicc and long 
mngcs, vliilc n niirturc coiitaiuing less of thc inost. cs~ieiisi~c material 
(magncsiuiii) nnsvicrs every purpose for less distnut sigiinlliug niid for 
practicc. 
Encli signalling party consists of n Non-Conimissioncd Olliccr and 
two mcn, and, in  vcry iinpoi-tant positions, an Oficcr niny $\rnys be c111- 
ploycd with ndvantngc. In  addition to tho flags and laiiips tlcscribcd, 
cacli sliould bc furnislicd with n good tclcscopc on n sinall portable 
stand, :t pair of licld glnsscs, n cotlo book, n ri1css:Igc holi, a d  soliic 
small storcs for kecpiiig up tlie light- for night use ant1 gcncral 
~~llrposcs. 
‘.I’IIC articles of cquipnient t~cscribc(~, arc similar to tlioso sciit out to  
Abyssinia for visual signnlliiig ~ I I I ~ ~ O S C S ,  on which, Iiowcvcr, irnprove- 
limits linvc bccii Inaclc. Tlic pattcriis dccidcd iipnii arc cliicfly duc to the 
labours of Cnpt:iin Colonib, EX., arid Major Iloltoii, latc of tlic 12th Kcgi- 
mcnt, who were specially :ittaclictl to tlic Scliool of Nilitnry Engiuccr- 
iiig n t  Cliatliam, with n view to tlic dcvclopiiicnt of n good systcni of 
Arniy and Xnry signalliiig. Tlicsc Officers, with whoin TWS associated 
Licutcnnnt C. 11. C. IIalliett, 11.E., mide out tlic signal codc book, and 
:tiiyonc d i o  lias used it will, I aiii SIII‘C, bcar tcstinioiiy to its comlilete- 
l i e s  for tlic purpose rcquircd. 
Jlcss~gcs can lic sciit, both by tlic clcctric tclcgrapli and visual s i p  
nnlliiig, in cyplicr. In this way nil ciicmy ~ronld  bc unnblc to liinkc nsc 
of any ~o~iiiiiiiiii~ntioiis falliug into his hands, unlcss in posscssiou of the 
key, and tlic mus ing  c o n t r e t e q x  which so freqiicnlly occurrccl duriug 
tlie rcccnt i\mcrican ivar, could not takc plncc. For tlic trniisinissioii 
of ordinary writtcii or telcgmpliic mcssagcs n wry siniplc littlc appa- 
ratus, dcaigncd by J h j o r  ~ o l t o l i ,  has bccu ndoptctl. It posscsses the 
ndvautagc that if, by my c l i a n ~ ~ ,  it should fnll in tlic Iinnds of an 
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BIILITAXY TCLEGEAPIIT AKD SIGSALLIRG. 327 
cncniy, it is still quite useless witliont the I q .  It is npplicnblc to 
wittcii  niessngcs as wcll ns to tliosc sent by tclcgrnpli. Tlic ciphcr 
CiiiploycrI in tlic trnirsiiiissioii of mcssnges by code is prcciscly the snnio 
as that used in the Eoynl Nnq*. 
lllc tnblc nttnclicd to this paper gi\-cu tlic orgtinisntion of n unit of 
ficld tclcgroph equipincnt, wliidi lins been drnivii up on tIic basis of 
tiic csisting troops of tIic Koyal Enginccr ’i’miu, that having becri 
foiind tlic iiiost cfticicnt niid ccononiicnl conil)inntio!i. This organization 
wn.9 tricd, as far ns circiimstnnccs r~ould  ndniit, last suiiimcr a t  Aldcr- 
shot, niid \\-as found to niisivcr vcry ivcll. It rcccivcd thc nppro~-nl of 
tlic OEccrs in ininicdintc chnrge, as wcll ns tlint of Licutcnnnt-Gcncral 
tlic IPon. Sir J. Yorkc Scnrlctt, G.C.B., coinmanding tlic division. 111 
gcncrnl principles it is \-cry similar to tlint. of tlic l’russinu rmit of 
ficld telegrnpli equipinciit, though it dirfcrs from tlic lnttcr in  ~oiiic of 
tlic minor details. 
I inust now turn for n Iiiomcnt to \dint  I Iinvc tcrnicd tlic ‘& Rcscrvc 
Telegrapli Eqnilmcnt.” Tlic work to be pcrfonlicd by this division of 
tlic cquipnicnt would bc tlic coiistructioii aiid mniiitcnnucc of n siibstnn- 
t i d  pcriiiancnt liiic of telegraph along the mniu liuc of con~munic~~tioii 
of n force advniicirig into an cneiiifs country. Tlie rcpnir niid rc- 
orgnuization of csisting liiics \rould also form n part of thcir duty. 
Tlicso liiics \vonlcl gcncrnlly be dcstroyed by n retreating cnCi1Iy,.and 
i t  is probable that, in most cases, tlic vork to bc pcrformcd \rould 
amount t o  nil cntirc rc-ccmstruction. Tlic light linc of tclcgrnpli, 
wliicli ~roiiltl Lc uscd in tlic first iiistniicc, sliould be rcplnccd as rapidly 
as possible by n scmi-pcnnniicnt liric aid passed to tlic front. 
I n  orilcr to bc cffcctirc, this iiinin liiic of tclcgrnpli sliodd bo of tlic 
most substantial dcscriptioii and composcd of thc best mn tcrinls. Tlic 
cspcricncc of tlic Abyssininn Geld tclcgrapli provcd this to bc iicccs- 
snry, and, iii civil liiics of telegraph, the highest clIicicucy is only 
attnincrl by tlic iitniost cnrc in constriictioii nnd worliing, mid tlio 
cmploynicnt of tlic rcry bcst Inntcrinla. \Veatlicr l ins  ;I vcry marked 
cfftct on tlic ~\vdiillg of n liiic of telcgmpli. h liiic constnictcil of 
inodcratcly good or WCII clcfcctivc inaterinls will work in fino weather 
:is ~vcl l  as one coinposcd of tlic very bcst, Init ~i i i t  tlicni to thc test of :I 
storin, m i d  it  will bc found thnt tlic cnrcfnlly-nindc linc will bc i n  
workiiig order :uid fit to transmit mcssagcs to any cstcnt, wliilc tlic 
less carefully-constructcd liiio will liaro ccnscd to hare tlic polrer of 
transmitting messngcs a t  all. This is no tlicoreticnl nsscitioii, but is 
borne out (on tlic authority of Nr. Cullcy, lntc clcctricinn to tlic Electric 
and Inteniatioiial Tclcgrnpli Conipnny, and iiom cmployed on tlic Post 
Onicc tclcgrn-nphs) by the working of tlic pciminncnt lines of tclcgrnpli 
of the Unitcd Kingdoiii. IIaviiig, tlicrcforc, tlic iniprcssion that tlic 
iiinin line of tclegrnpli, coiinccting 211 h n y  in-thc Geld with its bnsc of 
opcrntions, should, to bc of use, bc nlwnys rclinblc and rcndy to send 
.iiicssagcs at  :ill tiiiics arid in nIt \venthers, I nin of opiiiioii flint tilo 
vcry bcst mntcrinls aiid \rorIininiisIiip sliould bc cniploycd in its coii- 
stiuction. I wish to be tliorouglily iuiderstood on this poiiit, bccnusc 
I linvc iiiorc tliiin oiice Iic:iid opiiiioiis csl~rcsscd, tililt for n milit:iy 
liiic of tclcgrapli, cstrciiio c;nx aiii\ esccllciico of matcrinls arc not 
1 7  
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
ns
 H
op
kin
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
0:3
8 1
1 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
3.38 >IILITAEY TELEGCAPIII' M'b SIGKALLiSG. 
required. I believe on the contrary, that  it is j us t  the position in 
wliicli n first-rate liue is required. j\herc the best materials :ire not 
obtainable mdcesliifts must of course bc used, but it will not do to 
construct n line of inferior materials, simply because i t  is n iiiilitnry 
line, when, a t  a slight additional expense, the best inaterials could hare 
been mado available. 
Time will not admit of my going into the details of men, stores, 
:md apparatus rcquircd in the construction of n innin line of telegrapliic 
communication. Suffice i t  to say that it wonld dcpend, in n great 
measure, upon the nature and rcsourccs of tlic country in which tho 
campaign mas to be undertaken, and should be so organised as t o  
admit of tlie constnictiou of a substantial line of telegrnph of tho very 
best description. Largo reserves of materials should bo provided a t  
intervals aloug tlic liiie.for repairs, as i t  is iuore than probable tliat 
claningo might be done to i t  by an enemy's operations. 
The use of tlic telegraph for stmtcgicnl purposes has been alrcncly 
I)racticdly esciq)lificCl during tlic campaigus alluclcd to in the coin- 
iiienceiiiciit of this paper ; its use, as applied to tactics, has still to bc 
worked out. 1 think however tliat, with snch ttn. cquipnicnt ns I h a w  
rougliIy sketched out, tb8i.e ixmld be no diniculty iii applying tlic 
system to t'.s I::t:er, as successfully ns it 1ias alrcatly been uscd with 
a2::3 forrncr movements of an :irniy. 
Assuing tlint  the main l i e  of telegraphic commiication of an 
Army had been cstablislied up to n certain point in its rear, it would 
bccoim ncccssary to start from that point and so to dispose our light 
field lines and instniments as to fulfill tlic follox-ing conditions :- 
1st. To conuect the Geld line with the main line of communication to  
the rear. 
2nd. To traisniit iutcliigciico and orders from the outposts covering 
tlic front of ail Army to a certain point in rear of its position. 
3rd. To trniisniit intelligence aiid orders fro111 its flanks to tlic same 
point. 
Each unit of ficld tclcgrapli equipment is divided into thrcc sections, 
cacli consisting of one travelling oflice and 13 miles of line \Fire, with 
tlic necessary carriages and apparatus. 
To form n linc, KO. 1 sectioit would connect with tho main h o  of 
coniinunication and pny out wire to the point (scc accompanying 
diagram), irlicrc KO. 1 Onice is to be stationed. From No. 1 Office, 
Xo. 2 section would fonii R branch line to tho riglit, and Xo. 5 
section :L siniilar line to the lcft; cncli would ruii out n line 6 iniles ill 
lcngtli in tlic direction of tlie riglit and lcft cciitrc of tlie force i i i  1)osi- 
tioii to tile poiiits \diere Onices KO. 1 a i ~ l  3 arc s1i01r.11 :- 
1 1  
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3IfLITARY TELEGRAPHY AND SiGNALLING. 322) 
7'11~ stat.Jii of KO. 1 Onicc is sup1)osed to ,c in rear of tlic poilit 
vlicrc tho rcscrvcs arc concciitratcd ; tlic stations of Sos. d and :; 
irt rear of tho rcscr-ics of tlic right mid left wiiig. Froni Onices Nos. 1 
:lilt1 3 two fresh branclics would bc started, oiic ou cadi sitlc i i i  tho 
direction of points iri the rear of thc riglit aiid left v-iiig, indicated in tho 
(lingram by tlic lcttcrs C, and C,, tlic other lines being iri tlic directioii 
of tlic fl:inl<s of thc force to t!ic points 17, arid F2. Each of thc two 
liiics cninnating froiii Ofices Nos. 2 mid 3 n-ould bc two niilcs I O I I ~ ,  
niakiiig, with thc fivc miles paid out in rear of tliosc ofiices, n total of 
9 niilcs of wire expended from cadi section, leaving n rcservc of 
9 miles on cadi braiicli for repairs mid coiit iiigeiicics. This coinplctcs 
the clcctiical portion of thc combiuntioii. 
It i d  bc noticed that the lines arc all ke l~ t  iii rear of tlic troops in 
1)osition. Tlic objcct of this is, that in tlic c:ciit of :ui order to retreat, 
they ni:ty bc reeled up aud got out of tlic way bcforc tlic t r o o p  Iiad 
so far retired as to becomc cutangled with tlic \\-aggo~is perforiiiiug 
this duty. The wire can be reclcd up casily, at tlic rate of 4 i d e s  
nu hour, a d ,  on an emcrgcncy, can bc rc-cled up at n trot on n good 
road ; tlierc is, tlicrcfore, no danger of being too slow, providcd t l w  
iiotice is given to retire. It will bc ohscrred, too, that if the stations 
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330’ NILITARY TELEGRAPHY AKD SIGNALLING. 
GI and Fl arc dismantlcd, mcssages could stiII bc scut from Officc No. 2, 
n sllort disttlnce in their rcar, thc latter being rctainecl in position as 
long as possible after tlic more distmt stations Iind been withdmwn. 
Should OlIices Kos. 2 and 3 bc obligcd to retirc, they could bc attached 
to any point on tlic lines coiirerging ou Ollicc KO. 1, and messages 
transmitted till n further rctreat became necessary. Tlicsc opera- 
tions of reeling up and retiring, iri rcar of n rctiring column of 
troops, WCI’C tried last summcr, a t  Aldershot, and no difficulty was 
experienced in tlicir execution. 
Scst, as regards tlie disposal of tlic visual signallers attached to 
the Ficld Tclegrapli Equipment. Thesc are intended to connect the 
outposts of an Army with tlic estrcniitics of the electrical systciii, as 
sho~vn in tlic tiingram, where S,, S2, S,, and S, show tlic positioiis 
in mhich t h y  would bc placed. lire arc cngnged at  present in 
iiistructing at  Chatliani, an ORicer and two Kon-Coniniissioncd Oficers 
froni cadi regiment of cavalry and infantry, and each brigade of artil- 
lery in tlic service, as instructors aiid assistarit instructors in visual 
signalling. Thesc Ollicers and Non-Commissioned Officers, on rejoining 
their regimcnfs, arc supposcd to instruct n certain number of me11 
iri caeli corps, so that \vhcn employcd on outpost duty, tlicy would be 
able to send information by signal ; tlius any corps on ndiom thc outpost 
duty dcrolved, W O U ~ ~  at ontc arrangc its sigiiallcrs with n ricw to 
tlic transniissioii of information to tIic Officers commanding tlic out- 
posts, wlio \~oulcl placc tlicnisdrcs iu communication 11-ith tlic sig- 
n d h s  S,, S,, S,, and S4, bclon~ing to the Field Tclegrapli Equipment, 
with n r i c v  to tlie transmission of such infoimatiou as t h y  may 
dccm dcsirablc to head quarte1-s. Tlie scrics of dots on the 
diagram rcprcscnt tlic linc of regim61ita1 signallers. In practicc 
thc. signallers mouild be placed in sucli positions, ncoordinw to the 
forniation of tlic ground, as would bcst suit tlicir \i-orIi, an(1 a t  ;I?Istancea, 
according to tho cleamcss or otherwise of tlic atniosplierc, not gcnc- 
rally cscccding four or firc miles. 
Tlic organization of tlie equipment described, docs not proriclc for 
the collection of inforination ; this niust be clonc, as licrctofore, by 
x-idcttes, pickets, aucl Staff Oficcrs, and the tclcgrapliic system must only 
bc regrarclcd as n means of rapid transmission. I n  practicc wc Iini-c 
found that tlic attention of signallcrs is amply occupied in thc perform- 
nncc of their legitimate duties, riz,, tlic transmission of nicssagcs, 
and any attempt to combinc the duties of collection and transmission 
has not been found to IvorIi satisfactorily. 
It is again ,i grcat mistakc to suppose that tlic iisc of 1-isual signalling 
will, in any considerable degrcc, enable us t o  dispense with aides-dc- 
camp and mouuted messcngers. At short distanccs tliesc latter Kill 
still be as necessary as crcr, just for tlic sanic reason that in addressing 
n geutlcman across n room, it would not bo adrantageous to send n 
letter by post. Telegraphy and signalling come into play a t  distances 
and under circumstances where mounted mcsscngers are comparatively 
useless ; by thc fornier (telegraphy and signalling), n e  aie supplied with 
:I IICW aiid p~u-crfiil agency, by tlic propcr use of wliicli \vc can produce 
results unattainablc by otlicr incaus. 
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T H E  POSITION OF T H E  TROOPS IS THAT OCCUPIED BY THE AUSTRIANS A T  6 O'CLOCK A .  M 
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;\IILITARP TELEGRAPnP AND SICINALLING. 331 
In concliisiou, I ~0u l i1  call your nttciition for n niomcnt to n practical 
application of tlic system I propose. On the accompanying diagram 
(Plntc LKIV.) I hnvc slictdicd ont tlic arrangcmcnt of field clectric tclc- 
graph and signallers, which sccnis applicable to tlic gromid 011 ~ l i i c l i  tlio 
battlo of I<oriigriitz \vm foilght. 1 m o d d  proposc to malic n conncc- 
tion with thc main liiic n t  tlic fortress OF Konigriitz, and tliencc to forni 
n field Jinc to tlic vicinity of Zicgelsc1ilag2 wlicrc So. 1 Officc ~ 0 1 1 l d  
bc cstddislicd. Ih’oni this poiut N O .  2 6CCtlon IVodd forni n Iinc to tho 
right, as far as Scdclist, with branches to Chlnm and tlic Iiilt niarl;c(l 
near Scndrnsitz, and witli visual signallcrs beyolid tlic Trottiiin in ollc 
dircctioii, and bcxoiitl tho Bistritz iii tlic otlicr; if possiblc, n syitcnr 
of signalliug would bc cstablislicd, iri coiiiicctioii lritli tlic latter, as far 
as tho high ground iu tlic vicinity of Xilowitz. 011 tlio lcft 1 n-oultl 
propose, with So. 3 scctioii, to forlii n liiio to Stczircli, cstablieliiiig 
No. 3 Oflice at this point, witli blniichcs to  tlic liill, on u-liich is lilncctl 
tlic village of Prini, a i d  through tlic wood iii tlic (1ircctio:i of 
Ihadck. From tlicsc points I woiild proposc to tlirow out visual 
sjgiinllcrs in tlio dircction of Xecliaiiitz and Kmisitz. 
It Trill bc rcmcnibcrcd thnt tlic attack of tlie first Prussian Army and 
tlie Army of tlic Elbe, tho whole midcr the command of Princc Frcdcrick 
Cliarlcs, was made early in tho day, along the liiic of tlic Bistritz; that 
this Arniy iiiatlc n steady atlraiicc up to certain point, and that 
bctwccn tn-0 and tlircc o’cloclc in tlic aftcriioon t h y  mcrc checkcd ; 110 
iiinterial admncc was niado for n long iiitcrvol oi  tiiiic, and tlic position 
of affairs scciiicd most critical. This state of matters was finally tcr- 
Ininatcd by the successlo1 attack of tho second ihiy,  iinder tlic Crown 
Prince of Prussia, on the riglit of tho Austrian position, and by liia 
pcuetrating to tlic village of Cliluni, co~pnrativcly littlc rcsistniico 
Iinying becii made to his adriiice. From this moment tho fate of tlic 
battlc i n s  clccidcd, and -+tory declared for tlic Piiissians. 
11s regards tlic niovcnients of tlic two Prussian Aimics 011 this occa- 
sion, tlicrc is 110 doubt that, Iiad thcy bccn in posscssioii of n good 
system of risunl signdliiig, they n-onld Iinrc bccn ablc to cstcnrl their 
tclcgrapliic opcrations so far as to havc been able to communicatc far 
more readily along tlic csistiug lincs of clcctric tclcgrapli tlinii tiicy 
did. I sco 110 rcasoii,  orc cover, why t h y  slionld not linvc coniniuui- 
cated directly by visnnl signals, as they mcro witliiri signalling distance, 
by nqon on tlic clay in qiicstion. 
As regards the Austrians I think that, with n systcni of clcctric tcle- 
graph and -&ma1 signalling, arrnngcd sonicmhat as in tlio accompanying 
sketch, there is no doubt that much iiioro nut1 earlier information 3s to 
tlic cncmy’s niorcniciits \vould linve bccii obtained, oud i t  is possiblc that 
sonic iiisiglit would linvc bccn gniucd as to his opcrations in tlic riciiiity 
of Ililowitz. Tlic ncrs  of the ndvnricc of tlic sccoiid Prussian Army on 
the riglit u-ould have beeu rcceivcd a t  ail earlier period of tlic day, a d  
inn ~llorcautIieiitic form, and more time woiild linrc bccii gircii to linvc 
inatlo tlic iicccssnry preparations to rcsist tlic attack in that. qnartcri 
In tlic C ~ S C  of n Inrg-c force admicing to nicct mi cncniy, :ind 
moving along n scries of p:irallcl roads, I wtiiild suggest tiic sanic k i i i t l  
of foruiation as for an army in position; that is to say, KO; 1 sectioii 
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332 311T.lTARP TELEORAPIIY Ah’D SIGNALLIh’G. 
slioitld forui n liiic in cotitinuntion of tlic sciiii-~~crti~;itictit Iinc to tltc 
bnsc of operations, v-liile SOS. 2 and 3 would conncct to tho right :iIi(1 
left, and forni lines to tlic flank witli signnllcrs tliroim out as before. 
riI~\-ays upposing that tlic semi-pcrniancnt linc i rns coniplctcd witIi 
silficictit rapidity froni tlic rear, tlicrc would bc no difiicitlty iti :I l l-  
vnncing thc niaiii liiic, to I x c p  itp with tlic dnily advnncc! of tIic force 
by incnns of No. 1 section, wliilc SOS. 2 and 3 I\-ould bc required cacli 
day to reel lip, and, after advancing by pnrnllel roads, to re-cstablisli 
tlic branch lines a t  tlic nest lidtirig plncc. BZanmnvrcs oti this priti- 
ciplc werc cnrricd out by tlic French during iho suninier of ISGS, a t  
tlic cnnip at Clinloiis, an ndvancing force liming been, followd 1111, ntitl 
tdegraphic comniuriicatiou establislicd daily bctwen its flanks niid 
cciitrc. KO dificulty \\-as cspcriciicctl in carryiiig out tlic plan pro- 
1)oscd. A grcntcr qiiniitity of linc wirc wonld, Iiowcver, bc rcquirctl 
to ~rork sucl~ nu arrnngcment eflccttdly, 211d it. codd best be (lotic 1)y 
tllc eiiiplopctit of two wits of cquilimctit, instead of one, as by sucli 
an addition of uicnns the \\TorIi of C ~ C I I  unit I Y O I I ~ ~  bc rcduccd to the 
tiismniitliiig of tho line, followcd by n mnrcli on tliu first day, and tlic 
construction of n h i e  on tlic S E C O I I ~ ,  and SO on, on altcriiato days. 
‘J’liis woiild reduce tlic work to bc pcrforiiied n;itliin rcasoiinblc liiiiits. 
‘Yo do all witli n siiiglc unit u-oiild ctitnil cnornious cxertioti, u-liicli 
could iiot IIC kept 111) contiiiuously for any Iciigth- of tiiiic bj- niiy 
sinfile sct of iiien and Iiorscs. 
1:rom our cspcriciicc of the spccd n-liicli lins bccn attained in tlic con- 
strnctioii of n linc with thc equipment proposcd, tlicrc is no doubt but 
tlint n field clcctric-tclcgrapll C O U I ~  bc formed sufliciciitly q1licliIy iri rcar 
nf n forcc ndvnncing to the nctu:d attack of ati cnemy oil an cs- 
tcnsivc front, to criablc constaiit and effectual conimunicntioli to bc 
kept 111). For csample, at  tlic battle of Kouigriitz, thcrc ~i-ould Iinrc 
bee11 no dificulty in carryiiig o w  line in rear of tlic forcc ndvnncing o i t  
YiIIngc of S d o x n ,  ~ s l i i b  aiiotlier iiiiglit Itnve foIIo\rcd itp the 
Priissinit right attnck, iindcr IIcrwartli Poll Bittenfield, aiid if the two 
llad bccn inndc to converge iipoii Xlowitz, mcssngcs could linrc 
J)XSC(I to and fro 11-itli spced and facility, atid it  irould 110 longer linvo 
bccn ncccssnry for tltoso on tlic Icft, to g ~ s s  thc probnl~lc siicccss of 
tllc riglit nttnck by tlic mo\-cnicnts or stationary position of the smoko 
of tlic firing. 
For such a combitintioil i t  is, of course, not essential tliat tlic 
tc]cgrapli sliould bc attaclicd to tho main liiic of communicatioii. 
During rcccnt cauipnigiis, very large iiunibcrs of mcn 1inv.c bccii 
iiianacuvred togcthcr iii tlic ficld, numbers diicli  cover such n space, 
that tlie ordinary iiieatis of communication, by mountcd nicsscnge~s, 
C X ~  never fulfil tlic duties of transmission of orders aud iiitelligciice 
\i-itIi sufh’ciciit rapidity; and just as a bnttnlion is most cffectiially coiii- 
tnnndcd by thc roicc, and n brigade or division by inenus of iiiouiited 
I I I C S S C I I ~ C ~ ~ ,  I believe ;I forco of 100,000 mcii and up\vnrds would bc 
most cffccttrnlly conininndud by telcgrapliy and sigtinlling. 
Iii this country wc are undoubtedly slow ill taking itp any ncir 
yiiwtioii conucctcd with tlio nrt of war; tho sort of idw that activc oprrn- 
\ioiifi nIo n rqiioto contingency, coiiibincrl tviLli tho sicivfi of ccoi~orli~* 
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3IILITARY TELECiRAP~P Ah’D SIQXALTAIXG. 333 
iintler ~diiclt ltc ilriiiy Estimitcs arc n l~wys  drnwit up, act prcjudicinlly 
against tlic iutroduction niid effectual devclopmcnt of any iniprovcuicnts, 
and thc clcctric tclegrnpli is no csccptioii to this rulc. Alniost cvcry 
Enropcnn nation, csccpt Grcnt Britain, lins iiow n propcrly orgnnizctl 
field clcctric telegraph ; C Y C I ~  thc smaller powers, such as U:imrin, 
Bclgiiim, Denmark, Ac., Iinl-c tlicir properly coiistitutctl cquipnicnts. 
WC Itnvc tlie most aiithcutic inforinntioil conccriiing tlic I’russinii 
equipnicut, ; this consists of six complctc units of field tclcgraph, or in 
0 t h  words 18 travelling ofliccs and 180 miles of h i e  wire, tlicsc arc in 
chnrgc of the Enginccr Corps at. Berlin, and arc all rcady to tnlic the ficld 
a t  n few days’ notice. Urcnt Ihitnin ])os~csses, at this moment, n fcir  
csperinientnl cnrringcs aiici S miles of csperiiiiciital wirc at  Clintlinni ; 
niid carringes nnd inatcrinl for one section of n i i i i i t  arc 1iwv 1)ciitg 
orgnnizcd at  Wool\ricli: tltcsc lnttcr will rnisc our total by onc trawl- 
ling onice and 12 iiiiles of cfficicnt conducting wire, making n total of 
20 inilcs iii all. IVc liavc no organisation csccpt on pnpcr, and that. 
Itas iiot yet becii snnctioncd by propcr authority. If IVC arc evcr to 
u~orl; tlie qiicstioii out, so as to ai.rirc a t  a proper coiiclusioii, it is 
mnnifcst tlint far grcatcr nlcnns inust bc put a t  our clisposal ; and, :is n 
iiiiiiiniuni, I would proposc o m  uuit of cquipmcnt pcrnianently liorsctl 
and rnnnncd, with two iiiiits coniplctc a i d  ill stoic, oidy rcqiiiriiig liorscs 
aiid iiicn to put tlteni 011 n war footing. 
Sincc this paper has bccn writtcn, wc Itnvc dccidetl to rcconiincnd tlic 
addition of n light boat to tlic ficld tclcgraph equipment. It is proposcd 
to mrry tliis boat, with otic bay of pontoon bridge equipment, on n cnr- 
ringc drawn by fonr horses. It would bc used to carry tlic linc across 
sivcrs ; wlicrc n road crossed at  n ford, i t  would uot be dcsirablc to Iny 
an insulated line through tlie ford, as it. rou ld  be likely to be iujurctl 
by the trallic; it  mqst bc laid somc littlc distancc nwny in order to 
keep it securc. Siniilnrlg, it would iiot bc dcsirablc to Iny it Ycry closc 
to n pontoon hidgc, as it ~vould get inised up with tho anchors ant1 
otlicr tncklc : in this case, tlicrcfore, it  must bc plnccd sonic littlc dis- 
tnncc away. In tliesc and similar positions, tlic boat r o n l d  be uscfiil. 
Tho Prossinns include n sninll boat as n part of their field telcgrnplt- 
eqnipent.  Oiic of thc ordinary boats of tlic pontoon cquipmcnt would 
bc too Iicnvy and rcqiiirc too ninny iticn to mnnngu it, and woiild iiot, 
tliercforc, be npplicnblc for thc servicc required. A much smallcr and 
lighter boat is, tltcrcforc, about to bc designed for this purpose. 
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3.74 MILITARY TELEQRAPIIIT ASD SIGNALLINO. 
DETAIL OF OFFICERS, NES, LYD HORSES. 
------- 
[Captain Troop. Conininnding . . . . . . . . . .} 1 .. 
3 . . OKccrs .. . . . Licutcnnnts . . . . .. . . .. 
Total.. . . . . . . . . . . 
Officcrs’ b.it lioncs 
Xi.-C. Oficcrs 
Artificers 
and Nen. 
Troop Scrgcant Major.. 
Troop Qunrtcnnnstrr 
Scrgcnut. . . . . . . . . 
Pay Scrgcnnt.. . . . . . . . 
bfountcif . . 
Scrgcants { Dismount c i  
Xountcd . . 
Corporab { D kniountci 
Disniountec 
Lancc ?\Iountcd . . 
Corporals { DiimounteC 
Fnrricr Scrgennt . . :. . . 
C o r p o d  srtifiecrs. . i . . 
Shoeing smiths.. . . . . . 
Collar mnkcrs . . . . . . . . 
Wicclers . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Cnrpcntcrs . . . . . . . . . . . 
Trumpcters . . . . . . . . . . 
Bnnncrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Total.. . . . . 
1 
.. 
.. 
3 
3 
G 
G 
G 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. - 
25 
.. 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 
2 
G 
3 
3 
3 
3 
90 
PO 
220 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
r- 
43 
- 
G 
_. 
1 
1 
1 
6 
3 
3 
G 
3 
G 
3 
G 
1 
2 
G 
3 
3 
3 
3 
90 
55 
20 
245 
- 
d 
2 
0 
U n 
12 
G 
15 
1 
1 
1 
6 
3 
3 
3 
1 
3 
- 
3 
100 
20 
145 
- 
Rcninrlis. 
Tlic CIIA~RJIAS : I linvc grcat pleasurc in moving n rotc of tliaiiks to 
Captain Stotlicrd for thc instructivc arid interesting papcr just read. 
I quito agree with tho closing remarks of tlic Icctiircr, as to tlic 
desirability of extending tho IIW of telcgrapliy and signalling in tho 
nrnly, and so sccuring tlic rapid and accuratc transiiiission of incssagcs 
aiid ordcrs. I t  is iiiost dcsirablc to  do this in  tlie tiuic of pencc, so 
2s to bc prepared to usc tlic system in pcrfcction in the event of war. 
'flit grcat admiitage of military tclcgrapliy has bccn fully cscmplified 
ia the late bnttlcs bctnrecn Austria and Prussia, xhcn  tho General iu 
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coinmnnd of tlic Prussinn Army made free iisc of tlic tclegnpli, and 
no doubt orred his easy victories i n  no small degrct? to its aid. KO 
one can dcng tha t  of two opposing armies in the field, tho onc with 
tlic best means of collecting information and conwying it nccurntcly 
and rapidly from point to  point, will bc mnch thc stronger in fighting 
pon-er. Thc  question of cost, thcrcforc, shodd not arise, for tiic 
cspensc of supplying the tclegrapli. apparatus and training tlic meu, 
will be snrcd over and over again. TIE adrnntngcs of I i n ~ i n g  :I 
wcll-organized systcm of Te1egr:iphing and Signalling for tlic British 
Army, can not bc too often, or too enrncstly, insisted on. 
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